Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses situations where one might rationalize testifying falsely or even, as we shall see, imply or intimidate with the possibility of testimony under false pretenses if the ends justify the means:
From where is it derived with regard to a student whose teacher said to him: You know concerning me that even if one were to give me one hundred times one hundred dinars, I would not fabricate a claim. Now, I have one hundred dinars in the possession of so-and-so, to whom I lent money, but I have only one witness of the two required to testify about the loan and enable me to collect payment; from where is it derived that the student shall not join with the other witness and testify? It is derived as the verse states: “Distance yourself from a false matter, devar sheker” (Exodus 23:7).
The derasha seems to come from the extra word “devar sheker,” “false matter.” The verse could have simply stated, “distance yourself from falsehood.” What is a devar sheker, a false matter? It implies even something that has a substance of falsehood within it, such as misleading or manipulative behavior.
The Gemara asks: Is it from the verse “Distance yourself from a false matter” that this matter is derived? But isn’t he certainly lying in that case, and this is already stated, as the Merciful One states: “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13)?
Meaning, this is not just a subtlety but an outright lie, which should not be permitted, no matter the justification.
Rather, the reference is to a case where the teacher said to him: It is certain that I have one witness, and you come and stand there beside him and do not say anything, as in that manner you do not express a lie from your mouth. Your silent presence will create the impression that I have two witnesses and lead the debtor to admit his debt. Even so, it is prohibited to do this, due to that which is stated: “Distance yourself from a false matter.”
We see from here the linguistic difference between devar sheker, a false matter, and falsehood. Falsehood is an outright lie, while a false matter includes actions that might be, in the ultimate sense, true, but have falseness blended into them.
Rashi comments on Yehuda’s initial report about their family back at home to the viceroy of Egypt (Bereishis 44:20), where they indicate that Yosef died, even though he did not know this factually:
He uttered this matter of untruth (devar sheker) out of fear. He thought: if I tell him that he is alive, he may say, “Bring him to me.”
Rashi uses the idiom devar sheker, false matter, instead of falsehood. Daf al Daf brings a question on Rashi’s choice of words based on our Gemara above. Yehuda was not merely engaging in devar sheker, false matters; he was lying outright. Why did Rashi choose the softer language? Some actually change Rashi’s text and emend the word “devar”, omitting “sheker”.
I would like to suggest a different answer. I think Rashi felt that the cases described in our Gemara, where a person was engaging in outright falsehood because of an ultimate justification, such as false testimony to restore property to the legitimate owner, is still an outright forbidden lie. That is why the Gemara could not accept that testifying about this would be anything other than blatant falsehood and not merely “false matters, devar sheker.” However, in Yehuda’s situation, he did not know for sure that Yosef was alive, and after all, they sold him as a slave, which is not necessarily good for longevity. Additionally, his motivations for lying were not merely for financial gain but to preserve their lives. This might not be considered actual falsehood but rather something like a false matter. Therefore, I believe Rashi’s choice of words is not problematic.
Reflecting on the entire issue of lying under certain pressures, we find other biblical figures lying as well, often women such as Sarah or Rivkah, or at least participating passively in a lie, such as Rachel on her wedding night.
Men and women have different tendencies and emotional defenses. Often, when men are frustrated, they may turn to aggression. When women are frustrated, they may turn to more passive forms of aggression. This is not always true, but it is a pattern of masculine and feminine behavior. Thus, if a woman feels angry or trapped, she is less likely to respond with aggression and more likely to take covert action, such as lying. The idea that women under pressure are more prone to evade the truth is not a criticism. It is an observation that the sages had, most likely coming from compassionately taking into account that they often feel physically overwhelmed and threatened and tend to react less aggressively than men do in a similar situation. This has to, in some way, affect how one behaves. It is just as much the man who contributes to the pattern as the woman, but nevertheless, it is a pattern important to recognize realistically.
We find a ruling in Bava Basra (49b) that operates off a similar assessment of male and female patterns of behavior:
The mishna teaches that a husband does not establish the presumption of ownership of his wife’s field by enjoying its profits. The Gemara suggests: By inference, the husband has the ability to bring proof that he purchased the field from his wife or received it as a gift from her and consequently be regarded as the owner of the field. The Gemara asks: Why is this proof decisive? Let her say: I did it, i.e., I gave or sold the field to my husband, only to please my husband, but I did not mean it.
In fact, it is described within the Torah with Sarah outright opting to lie out of fear (Bereishis 18:15) and Rivkah engaging in subterfuge and manipulation of Yitschok in pursuit of obtaining a blessing for Yaakov (see the beginning of Bereishis 27), as well as hiding the real reason that Yaakov had to run away (Esau’s murderous rage) by making it about shidduchim (end of Bereishis 27 and beginning of 28). It is notable that there is not much commentary from the sages on their behavior, even though typically, when a patriarch or matriarch is described by the Torah as sinning, it is mitigated with contextual explanations and justifications, such as by Reuven or Dovid Hamelech (see Shabbos 55b–56a). Yet, when it comes to Sarah’s or Rivkah’s behavior, we are met with silence. I believe the reason is that it does not require justification; it is simply the way between men and women.
There are practical relational applications to this principle. As the person in the relationship who naturally tends to more aggression, it is incumbent upon the man to check and double-check if his wife truly agrees to something or is just feeling intimidated. Rabbi Shlomo Hoffman (שיחות על שידוכים ושלום בית עמוד 147–148) relates that one Erev Yom Kippur, Rav Isaac Sher did not let him daven at the Yeshiva because he said, “You did not get permission from your wife.” Rav Hoffman objected, “But I did ask her, and she said yes.” Rabbi Sher replied, “That’s not mechilla! Any good wife would say yes under those circumstances! You need to ask her with real options, such as, ‘Should I go daven at yeshiva, or maybe I’ll daven vasikin and then I’ll watch the children while you go daven.’” Rabbi Sher did not let him daven at the Yeshiva until he traveled back home and obtained “real permission.”
Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation
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Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, LCSW-R, LMFT, DHL is a psychotherapist who works with high conflict couples and families. He can be reached via email at simchafeuerman@gmail.com