Our Gemara on this daf discusses the unique manner in which the bird sacrifice is slaughtered. Unlike every other kosher animal and bird, and even unlike a non-sacrificial bird, the slaughter must be done with the cohen’s thumbnail. While it is similar to slaughtering with a knife in that it severs the windpipe and the esophagus, but it must be done from the back of the neck, severing the back of the neck first. Ironically, what would render a non-sacrificial bird and animal unkosher is exactly what the sacrificial bird requires, and vice versa.

This is an important point because logically it implies something about the nature of the function of the slaughter. Let us assume that the slaughter provides a spiritual or physical benefit to the animal or the consumer. That benefit ought to be either by slaughtering one way or the other. If both are beneficial, why is one way good only for the sacrificial bird and the other for all other animals? This suggests there is something arbitrary about the requirement.

Bereishis Rabbah (44:1) seems to be addressing this very point:

“After all, why should the Holy One, blessed be He, care whether one slaughters an animal from the throat or he slaughters it from the nape? Thus we learn that the mitzvos were given only to refine the creations with them.”

The Rambam (Moreh III:26) understands this Midrash to be stating that in truth, the reasons for the commandments might be arbitrary, and in particular not necessarily meaningful to God. However, by following the rituals and being obedient, it teaches us service and humility and devotion toward God. (I assume the value of that is because such devotion develops humble character traits and the wish to emulate God.)

The Rambam then comments that such a position — that the mitzvos are essentially meaningless except for the purpose of teaching obedience — is not acceptable and devalues the great wisdom contained within the commandments. He therefore offers a distinction that both validates the commandments and the thrust of this Midrash:

“Each commandment has necessarily a cause, as far as its general character is concerned, and serves a certain object; but as regards its details we hold that it has no ulterior object. Thus, killing animals for the purpose of obtaining good food is certainly useful… However, the killing should not be performed by neḥirah but by sheḥitah (cutting the neck), and by dividing the esophagus and the windpipe in a certain place; these regulations and the like are nothing but tests for man’s obedience. In this sense you will understand the example quoted by our Sages [that there is no difference] between killing the animal by cutting its neck in front and cutting it in the back.”

However, the Ramban (Devarim 22:6) finds even this interpretation unacceptable. The divine Torah and commandments have deep reasons for them in general and in particular. The Midrash is making a different point: the mitzvos do not “give” God anything or fulfill any of His needs. He is not asking us to serve Him as servants to provide for the needs of their king. The mitzvos are created solely for the benefit they provide to humans, in the various ways that purify and elevate them. According to the Ramban the main point is to stress that God is above it all, and that we should consider the mitzvos as opportunities and benefits that He gives to us and not things we do for Him because He has a need or a demand.

The Ohr Tzafun (Shemos 28) takes this idea — that the mitzvos are there to purify man — and brings out a surprising and amazing dimension. He says sometimes even one mitzvah that is relatively inferior should be chosen over a relatively superior mitzvah, if by performing that inferior mitzvah it will further refine the person. He gives an example from a famous teaching: 

The Torah (Shemos 23:5) instructs a person who comes upon his enemy, who is having difficulty loading his donkey, to nonetheless help him out. The Gemara (Pesachim 113b) wonders how the Torah can casually refer to an enemy when it is forbidden to hate a fellow Jew. The Gemara concludes that it must be a Jew whom he saw was an unrepentant sinner. The Gemara (Bava Metzia 32b) poses the following ethical dilemma. What if your friend’s donkey needs to be unloaded (which is more important because the animal is suffering and perhaps will be damaged as well as the load), but your enemy’s donkey needs to be loaded up? The Gemara rules that it is better to load up the enemy’s donkey in order to teach one to overcome his evil inclination.

The Alter from Slobodka observes: we already determined that this is a person whom it is permitted to hate. Even so, the Torah is worried that your hate will carry over in a measure beyond what is permitted, (or you become habituated in hating); therefore one must overcome this inclination and nonetheless help his enemy’s donkey over his friend’s. Furthermore, even when in principle unloading is much more important because of the damage/loss/pain that will come if the donkey is not soon unburdened, the Torah still instructs to load the enemy’s donkey! Why? So as to train the will to overcome more hateful inclinations. If so, we see how one less significant mitzvah takes precedence over a more significant mitzvah if it also serves a function of purifying the person’s character.