Our Mishna on Amud Aleph discusses the animal who killed a person, whose ordinary fate is to be put to death. Why is the animal put to death? After all, does an animal have intelligence and awareness that make it liable for its actions?
There is an interesting verse (Bereishis 9:5):
“However, of the blood of your souls, I will demand an account; from the hand of every beast will I demand it. From the hand of man, even from the hand of man’s own brother, will I demand an account of man’s soul.”
The simple reading of the verse seems to indicate that God will punish a beast for killing a human. The Ramban (ibid) offers several answers, the simplest being that it is not so much about the animal’s culpability, but more about the sanctity of man — the death of a person is such a serious trespass, no matter the motivation or intent, that there must be a strong consequence. The Ramban says this is why the same fate occurs to an animal in the wilderness who has no owner.
Sefer Hachinuch (52) says something similar; however, the focus is to impress upon man the seriousness of death, even to the point of eliminating anything related to the death of another human being.
Both the Ramban and Chinuch can argue this notion is hinted at in other areas of the Torah, where there is a suggestion that the land itself becomes polluted by murder and must somehow be cleansed to avoid further ramifications of this injustice. See, for example, Bereishis (4:10) and Devarim (19:10 and 21:9).
There is also an odd Midrash that seems to hold animals responsible for higher-order thought and a decision to martyr themselves in the name of God. Pesachim (53b) tells us that Chananiah, Mishael, and Azariah decided to defy Nebuchadnezzar’s orders and allow themselves to be thrown into a furnace based on the behavior of the frogs during the plague, who threw themselves into the Egyptian ovens:
With regard to frogs, which are not commanded concerning the sanctification of the name of God, it is written: “And the river shall swarm with frogs, which shall go up and come into your house, and into your bedchamber, and onto your bed, and into the houses of your servants, and upon your people, and into their ovens and kneading bowls” (Exodus 7:28). When are kneading bowls found near the oven? You must say that it is when the oven is hot. If in fulfilling the command to harass the Egyptians, the frogs entered burning ovens, all the more so, we, who are commanded concerning the sanctification of the name of God, should deliver ourselves to be killed in the fiery furnace for that purpose.
However, the commentaries explain this Gemara in less literal ways, something along the lines that Chananiah, Mishael, and Azariah drew inspiration from the idea that the frogs could defy survival instinct; or perhaps the opposite, that a Jew must follow God’s command without forethought, like an animal behaves with instinct.
We also find the donkey of Rabbi Pinchas ben Yair who would not eat untithed produce (Chullin 7a), although that might have been due to some spiritual effect or instinct instilled via ownership. In support of this, according to Gemara Shabbos 151a, an animal does not attack a human unless the human diminishes himself and behaves as a beast. Likewise, we may say that the spiritual standing of the owner affects the behavior of the animal. The Midrash (Bereishis Rabbah 28 and Rashi Bereishis 6:11) tells us that not only were the humans promiscuous in the generation of the flood, but the animals followed suit, mating indiscriminately across species. And Meiri (Bava Kama 40a) states, “When the ownership changes, the animal’s nature and mazal change as well.”
Interestingly, Radak (Bereishis ibid) seems to hold there is a degree of animal liability. He states, “In relation to actions committed against man, the animal is held culpable for its behavior.” Rav Dovid Tzvi Hoffman (ibid) makes the strongest statement: “Even animals are liable for killing humans.”
While there is no evidence of intelligence in the form of advanced reasoning in animals, that does not categorically eliminate the possibility that, to a degree, an animal has a will and can make a choice. The Gemara (Bava Kama 4) delineates the liabilities incurred by an ox that gores, as opposed to one that tramples or eats and causes damage. The distinction lies in the fact that when the animal eats or tramples, it possesses no "intention" to cause harm, whereas when the ox gores, it "intends" to cause damage.
It appears that the Rabbis of the Gemara were not constrained by the sometimes arbitrary classifications of scientific terminology. I do not believe rabbinic or Biblical Hebrew employs a specific term for self-awareness or consciousness, as they did not evaluate animals through that lens. Nevertheless, they did consider humans to possess superior intelligence, primarily due to their ability to express themselves through language (see Targum Bereishis 2:7, Rashi, and Mizrachi). However, the intention to cause harm, while not seen as a sign of high intelligence, was viewed as the product of a being with some thought process, at least capable of wanting to cause damage and carrying out that desire. According to the Rabbis, an ox is indeed capable of intention.
This specific intention is not sophisticated. The ox did not "intend" to build a fusion reactor — as this ox is no rocket scientist — but it did intend to cause damage and succeeded with its plan. Destruction is much easier than construction or repair, and so even an ox can accomplish this.
A different Gemara (Nazir 10a) tries to understand a strange declaration made by the protagonist in the Mishna. The fellow is frustrated with his cow that is refusing to budge, and declares, “This cow says, I am hereby a Nazir if I get up.” Obviously, the cow cannot make declarations. The Gemara explains that when the person said “this cow says,” he meant to say, “this cow THINKS she is not going to get up…” — and then the person makes an oath in frustration. This seems to indicate the belief that the cow can have a thought process.
It seems that from some of the sources we quoted, it may be that some of our sages held that animals are capable of rudimentary thought and benefit or suffer in the physical world based on their decisions.
Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation
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Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, Rabbi Simcha Feuerman, LCSW-R, LMFT, DHL is a psychotherapist who works with high conflict couples and families. He can be reached via email at simchafeuerman@gmail.com