Our Gemara on Amud Beis discusses the use of a particular verse regarding the prohibition against offering a sacrifice outside of the Temple. If two people simultaneously lifted and placed limbs on the altar, they are exempted. Apparently, it is necessary for it to be an action by one person in order for it to be considered a form of inappropriate service. The rabbis derive this from the verse in Vayikra (17:8):

“If a man, and a man, of the house of Israel, or of the strangers who reside among them, offers a burnt offering or a sacrifice.”

In Hebrew, when you double a word it means emphasis. So “a man, and a man” can translate as “each and every man.” The fact that there is an emphasis leaves it open for a derasha. In this case, the emphasis is to stress: one man and only one man at a time.

Rabbi Yose must use a different verse, as he considers this phrase “a man, and a man” as stylistic and not extra verbiage. This is known as dibra Torah b’lshon bnei Adam (the Torah speaks in the vernacular), the Torah may use poetic and linguistic idiom (Berachos 31b).

There is a philosophical Midrash that quotes our verse about external sacrificial offerings which requires study. The Midrash (Vayikra Rabbah 22) states:

“Each and every man from the house of Israel who will slaughter a bull, or a sheep, or a goat”…There is a dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Neḥemya. Rabbi Yehuda said: Even matters that you consider to be superfluous for the world are beneficial for the world—palm fiber to make rope, a thorn bush to fence a garden…The Rabbis (and Rabbi Nechemia’s position; see Yismach Moshe, Acharei Mos 7) say: “The advantage of land”—even things that you consider superfluous in the world, like flies, fleas, and gnats, they too are included in the creation of the world, as it is written: “The heavens and the earth and their entire host were completed” (Bereishis 2:1).

The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis seems to be about whether every creation needs to serve a specific purpose (Rabbi Yehuda), or if it is good enough that it serves a purpose in a general sense. For example, do earthworms need to serve a specific purpose in every aspect of their design, such as aerating the soil—and nothing else—but the exact earthworm serves this function? Or do we merely need to aerate the soil, and it could have been through any number of variations of creatures or processes, with the earthworm being one such creature? Or does each plant and flower have to have a specific function or purpose, or is it enough that the earth needs flowers for function and beauty, and each specific species of flower is not individually required within the greater idea that the earth needs flowers?

This analytical distinction and dispute is reminiscent of a dispute between the Rambam and Ramban that we discussed in a blog post, Psychology of the Daf, Zevachim 65. Bereishis Rabbah (44:1) states:

“After all, why should the Holy One, blessed be He, care whether one slaughters an animal from the throat or he slaughters it from the nape? Thus we learn that the mitzvos were given only to refine the creations with them.”

The Rambam (Moreh III:26) understands this Midrash to mean as follows:

“Each commandment has necessarily a cause, as far as its general character is concerned, and serves a certain object; but as regards its details, we hold that it has no ulterior object… these regulations and the like are nothing but tests for man’s obedience.”

However, the Ramban (Devarim 22:6) finds even this interpretation unacceptable. The divine Torah and commandments have deep reasons for them in general and in particular. The Midrash is making a different point: the mitzvos do not “give” God anything or fulfill any of His needs. They are created solely for the benefit they provide to humans, in the various ways that purify and elevate them.

We might say the dispute regarding mitzvos between the Rambam and Ramban is the same dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis regarding the function of specific species and creatures.

There is one outstanding question. While this is a fascinating discussion, what connection did the Midrash see regarding these principles and the “each and every man…” prohibition of external sacrifices? The Midrash opens with our verse as if it is somehow related to this discussion!

Yismach Moshe (Acharei Mos 7) makes a brilliant connection. The decision to use “each and every man…” and not treat it as prose—dibra Torah b’lshon bnei Adam—is the exact same dispute as above. Is a general purpose (prose and poetic style) good enough for the Torah, or do we need a precise reason for these words?

We see a three-part philosophical dispute about the way in which Torah and the physical world are viewed; whether we need the idea alone to be purposeful regardless of the details, or do we need each detail to have a purpose.