Our Gemara on Amud Aleph discusses a Jewish version of emergency powers, whereby, in times of crisis, the Jewish court may take extra-legal steps and mete out punishments without due process:

Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: “I heard that the court may administer lashes and capital punishment, even when not required by Torah law. However, they may not administer these punishments with the intention of violating the statement of the Torah, i.e., to disregard the punishment stated in the Torah and administer another punishment; rather, they may administer these punishments to erect a fence around the Torah, so that people will fear sinning.”

No set of rules or laws can account for every possible contingency, and therefore, it is understandable that any legal system must have a gatekeeper—someone who, at times, will take extraordinary steps to ensure the safety of society. Even a divine law, which by definition is perfect, could not, in any practical sense, dictate every contingency. If it did, the code of law would become infinitely long to cover all the possible angles of human behavior, (see Magid Mishna, Laws of Neighbors 14:5). On the contrary, part of its divine perfection must be to leave room for occasional judgment calls by appropriately authorized leaders.

The Shalah (Torah Shebikhsav, Shoftim, Torah Ohr 13) and Derashos HaRan (11) each expand on this idea and shed new light on the role of a king in Jewish theology. They also explain why it was sinful for the Jewish people to demand a king during Shmuel’s time, even though the Torah states that it is a positive commandment to anoint a king (see Shmuel I:8:6 versus Devarim 17:15). Our Gemara’s allowance for the court to take emergency powers speaks specifically to a time when there was no Jewish king. When an active king is present, it is the role of the Sanhedrin to adhere to the letter of the law, while extra-legal matters and judgment calls are dictated and executed by the king.

We might consider this similar to the notion in American law that a president can issue a pardon and override a particular conviction from a regular court of law. In the ideal Jewish legal system, there would also be a balance of powers. The sages on the Sanhedrin would use their powers to administer law objectively, while, when necessary, the king—representing divine will, and possibly even the will of the people—could take steps toward extra-legal punishment or leniency. Yet, for this balance to be maintained, the opposite is also true. The king must ordinarily abide by the rule of law as dictated by the moral and traditional process by which halachah is decided.

With this in mind, we may now understand both the mitzvah to have a king within Jewish theology and government, as well as what was sinful about the demand for a king during the time of Shmuel. The people were not interested in a halachic process where they would rely on the rabbis and their court system to dictate the day-to-day rules. They were emotionally and spiritually weak and wanted a paternalistic king, who would have broad powers and dictate their morality. In other words, they desired a king not just for leadership in unusual moments that could not wait for consensus or moral deliberation, but they wanted to abdicate the role of the rabbis and tradition—using standardized laws, traditions, and moral reasoning to dictate behavior. 

This desire represented a regression to a more primitive, disorganized, and tribal style of leadership, which made people vulnerable to charismatic leaders who may promise much but ultimately risk becoming self-serving despots. Such a shift could allow an entire people to be degraded by laws that are not based on rationality and long-term altruistic goals.

Translations Courtesy of Sefaria, except when, sometimes, I disagree with the translation

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